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The beautiful Revolution

A true and authentic revolution cannot be a return in the history. It is not a catastrophe that can be decreed for tomorrow. It cannot be a simple act of illuminated with a lot of fanaticism but without a conscience and a classification for the fight. It is not a fleeting revolt, although the force is used, if it doesn't have ulterior objectives of transformation. It is not a jump to the hole, to the anarchy, to the disorder; it should have a why and a for what reason. It is not a mere reform, because there are conservative reformations and revolutionary reformations. Neither it is the relief of a social class for another emergent one in the handling of the political power and of the resources at its disposal.

The terms "bolivarian revolution" have encouraged from the beginning the whole process of change for Commanding Chávez. It is the eternal ritornello of his speeches, the watchword for all his followers at any level; the vigilant morals for the actions of taking of being able to and of government. It has transformed into the great flag that floating from Bolívar's homeland wanted to mobilize and to wrap up to the noble causes of our subcontinent. Hence, to be central axis of the current problem that Venezuela lives, we should manage it carefully, making of it kind of a colophon.

revolution-involution

By the light of those that have really made revolutions in the history and of their big ideologists and synthesizers, a revolution is serious thing and of great encouragement. It is not an improvisation game neither an adventure of fans. It requires as minimum three ingredients to be made and to stay: 1) It is a new order that implies a radical rupture with the previous one. 2) It requires a type of popular organization. 3) It implies a long one on the way to ideological

formation of militants and politicians.

1) Although he calls it to him 'revolution', the process of change led by Hugo Chávez has not represented neither it seems it will represent a radical change. It has not attacked the objective of altering the economic structure that stays in Venezuela from 1917 (when the oil era began), with an eye toward reverting the creation process and distribution of the social wealth, against which he has spoken so much. The features of the peculiar pathology of the Venezuelan economy have been accentuated, to what has contributed the level of prices of the petroleum that it has come growing gradually from 1999 until our days.

Don't leave how an uncertain reformation of the State, of which Chávez speaks, will radically modify the 'oil financier State' of Venezuela, in which we are submerged (and even happy), and of the one that they come out all the resources abundantly for the 'revolution', his agents and his machinery.

2) The revolutions are the result of a social management and of a popular very complex organization. Of it lacks the MVR (Movement Fifth Republic) that was the suitable one to motorize the 'revolution'. It should be the best positioned to recover the important functions of the State apparatus, but it has been the great failure recognized by its own leaders, and left to a side by the Boss. It is now attempted to give birth to PSUV (Socialist United Party of Venezuela).

But a social organization that is solid doesn't exist and guarantee of victory of this 'revolution' that begins to enter in a new stage. Stage that already has to be that of realizations and to complete promises made to for a needy electorate that begins to get tired. "When the money finishes the revolution concludes [...] with the support of the mercenaries a revolution it is not made. The mercenary is not played the life by anything neither for anybody (Rigoberto Henríquez Vera)."

Guillermo García Ponce, ideological advisory of Commanding Hugo Chávez and character free of any suspicion for the régime-, he had come insisting in the organization necessity to defend the revolution. In declarations, as leader of the directory of the Political Command of the revolution, he left very clear why the revolution needed big pliers (*El Nacional*, 20 January 2002):

"One of the fundamental flaws of this process is that he has stayed the division and the dispersion in the breast of the forces of advanced, what has allowed a breach for which climbers have been strained, opportunists, not identified politically with the process. In such a way that the Political Command closes that breach, it unites to the revolutionary forces and it makes more solid the Government's political floor".

The following one is the fragment from an interview to same García Ponce (<http://politica.eluniversal.-com/2000/06/14/110600d.html>):

•Without that organic support, does the president have a political very fragile floor?

--I would say that the president has a popular spontaneous, disorganized, electoral support, but it is not the support that he needs. The fragility of this support and of MVR it is measured by the fact that MVR has been unable to gain the union movement. How is it possible that MVR, with its magnitude and in the power, have not been able to reorganize this sector? The answer is obvious: because it doesn't have capacity for that, because it is an electoral simple instrument, because it doesn't have political, ideological floor. It has also been unable to gain the student movement.

•Doesn't it include the intellectuals?

-- Of course. That tells us of its political and ideological hole. And the president cannot rely exclusively on an electoral force.

•-And a revolution one can make without workers, students and intellectuals?

--Je, je, je... That is one of the tremendous flaws that have this process, and one of the signs of its fragility. This project relies at this time on two factors one, in the national tendency of change and other, in Chavez. But it lacks other paws: the organization, to add to the process -like forces of change- to those sectors and a political guide.

The 'chavism' constitutes a heterogeneous, broken into fragments and unequal identity, with diverse levels of adhesion, likeness, back, policies and militancy, very influenced by the identification grades and sympathy with regard to Chavez. Equally, the organized chavism has not been able to still transform into the ideological guide of the followers and sympathetic that allows the 'management' off the social wide movement that is emerging for the impulse of the presidential speech and the support of the Government"

(El Nacional, 16 May 2005).

3) And this 'revolution' has not traveled the ideological road that is usually long, before the taking of the power and indispensable for the same organization of the militants and followers. All socio-political revolution implies a 'cultural revolution.' The Bolshevik revolution -and of there it stops the communists ahead- were they made following the formation manual and "*What an organization to make?*", written by the great strategist Lenin in 1902. The "*Long March*" for the Chinese immense territory was the instrument devised by Mao-Sedung to go summoning, forming ideologically and organizing in armed militias the hosts of peasants with which it would impose in China the Popular Republic. When he tried to correct supposed deviations in the revolution, it untied the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1969), showing the conditioning value that the conscience and the culture have on the economic reformations. It can only this way be avoided that a revolution is colonized by the opportunists that use it like means to climb in status and to reach a sudden easy wealth. Other strategists have devised alternative forms of formation of

conscience revolutionary and fight organization, as Che Guevara and Castro, with the application they made of the "guerrilla focuses".

Well he has said a political Venezuelan philosopher that "the social deep and radicals transformations only happen because in the scenario a new one appears 'social formation.' So there is not transformation without formation!" (Maximo Desiato).

The people: bottom question

Personally I have arrived to the convincing that the bottom problem that underlies to the genuineness of the 'revolution' summoned by Chávez -a problem that conditions the reliable development of this process and it lifts doubts on a successful end-, it resides in the concept and "people" reality (I Assume reflections of Carlos Blanco in his book *Revolution and disillusion*)..

"People" - in their juridical sense that is the one that is applied from the French Revolution (1789) in all the Constitutions of the world - they are all the citizens of a State, whichever it is the place where they are. They constitute 'people' those that are subject to the imperium of the State, tied by the bond of the citizenship, live or not in their territory. "The sovereignty resides without transfer in the people who exercises it directly in the form foreseen in this Constitution and in the law, and indirectly mediating the vote, for the organs that exercise the public power" (Constitution of Venezuela 1998, art. 5).

They don't form the 'people' neither the foreigners, neither the minors, neither those declared unskillful to exercise their civic rights. A good technical definition of 'people' gives it Maritain when he says that it is "the common of people that, low united fair laws, for the mutual friendship and for the very common of its human existences, they constitute a political society or a political body"(*The Man and the State*).

Chávez's vision didn't go to constitute the Venezuelan citizens as social fellow of a 'revolution', but only a support mass to the régime. The people transformed into an empty inflabel according to the joint and political necessities of the process, in the leader's opinion. The régime built a "people" to the measure of their support requirements that initially were those of destroying the old system 'corrupt' and to leave their institutions 'oligarches.' 'I populate' it was good (inspired by Robespierre and the unicameral Assembly of the People in the French Revolution) to elaborate the "revolutionary new Constitution and bolivarian." Chávez's victories have only been some electoral mounted results on some impoverished masses that they follow a leader that still has money to distribute. These masses have not been constituted in anything resemblance to a revolutionary army, neither to a proletariat combatant, neither to an indoctrinated peasant and armed. They have been peaceful voters, radically unhappy with the political previous order, and that they still dream of the promises of a more fair, honest and able new order of distributing the wealth well. These voters are still source of force and political genuineness in the mark of the democracy existent, but not outside of it like a revolutionary force, committed with the designs of a radical and organized rupture to take them to effect.

The 'revolution' perhaps it exists in the mind and in the commander's speech, but it is this way non suitable. The revolutionary people doesn't exist. The citizens that only continue being as disorganized multitude exist and it disperses. The power of the people (in who is supposed it resides the sovereignty) has been used for the acclamatory electoral rites and he has come being in fact breastfeed for an only and extremely dense domain center: that of commanding Chavez. He has transformed into the Venezuelan political "black hole". This is not a popular (that is to say of the people) true revolution in any time of the history and in any country of the world.

"Chavez attempted the jump from the oil underdevelopment to the socialism and he finished splashing about without real project in the means of the destruction, without being able to build anything

alternative. Neither it was socialism, neither bolivarianism, neither advanced democracy, neither third via, but an intent of demolishing the old agents of the political system, obtaining, at the end that many of them revived" (C. Blanco).

Of the one proclaimed 'revolution' it doesn't go being but a bitter one 'disillusion' or maybe less, an 'involution', that is to say a march behind of many years, a fall impelled by the law of the 'entropy' that it affects all the phenomena of our universe and it goes taking to Venezuela toward the disintegration, to levels of smaller development and complexity.

"The leader that has said that he is not anything, but you grieve a 'pálpito' of the people, a taken blade and brought by forces that he doesn't manage, he finishes conceiving you as the everything, the axis, the leader cannot be replaced, because after all, he is the final transubstantiation of people. At the end, what was left of the revolution's game of mirrors is Chávez. He is the people" (C. Blanco).

By the way

The serious and objective study of indicators that we applied in previous pages to the reality of the 'fourth Republic', now after the eight years that it takes the intent of 'bolivarian revolution' takes us to affirm that "for the time being" there has not been a radical evolution toward 'better', but a gradual involution toward 'worse'.

Sincerely we wanted that a different conclusion came out of the premises, but it is not possible "for the time being", respecting a logic and a rigorous methodology. And on this there is a very widespread agreement of authorized studios and analysts of the country. From different angles and each one with a peculiar style, we pick up a brief anthology of the opinions.

* For José Virtuoso, S.J., Chavez defrauded the expectations of change (*El Nacional* 7 December 2003). "Chavez represented the real possibility to substitute a political class for other and of starting all those expectations. But Chavez has not driven the process indeed in that address, and I believe that good part of the current dissatisfaction in the bottom is not because people want to return to the past; the current dissatisfaction is because transformation was proclaimed and the change has not been given [...] Chavez's first problem was to be surrounded of an incompetent leadership. The second problem has been to approach the problems of the country from an imaginary one 'anachronism' [...] Chavez's great success has been to put in the mat of the national concern, not only the problem of the poverty, but the face of the poor. With Chavez the poor recovered their dignity like actors of the society and the possibility of feeling grateful. The great problem was that those expectations rose but they were not possible to take to the land of the concrete thing".

* For Aníbal Romero (*El Nacional*, 13 August 2003 and 12 July 2000),

"the 'revolution' has made, among other, five types of crimes":

1) hurt-humanity's crimes, as Puerto Llaguno; 2) abuse of power and violations of the Constitution, including creation of paramilitary groups and of a parallel army; 3) betrayal to the Homeland, by means of the agreements with Cuba and the bonds with the Colombian guerrilla, committing the national security; 4) persecution and harassment of the democratic opposition; and 5) graft and perverse use of the public money.

"We live a sad and pathetic 'revolution' driven by men and women that are not possessed by a faith, but harassed by a previous failure and still dazzled by a more uncertain utopia. It is a 'revolution' without masses and every day with popular smaller heat, a 'revolution' it makes sick of paradoxes and contradictions that it doesn't hit upon to be defined and it hides after the tinsels of an 'anachronic' and essentially anti-democratic hairdresser. To its head it is a leader that combines all the features of the demagogic populism with the appeal to a military universe that is not able to, without being destroyed, to change their professionalism for a political commitment without compass and without destination. A violent leader that, in passing the traditions, norms and military

regulations, and for the first time in our history he forces to General and Admirals to be subordinated a man adorned with Lieutenant-colonel's uniform"

* For Massimo Desiato (*El Nacional*, 16 December 2001),

"the bolivarian revolution, recently denominated by Manuel Caballero 'revolution of saliva', activates a bad utopia, it doesn't promote neither it motivates the action."

* For Gustavo Tarre Briceño (*El Nacional*, 5 January 2003):

The revolutionary big processes have brought many bad habits. What has made Chavez is to only take those negative elements of the other revolutions, but not the changes. In the first place, it is the intolerance: the society is divided between good and bad, the opposition qualifies to him as counterrevolution, all that favors to the revolution is good and all that is opposed is bad. On the other hand it is the emergence of a privileged new class that substitutes to the political previous elite and lives off the privileges of the power. The revolutions usually show up inefficiency, for the improvisation or for the bad policies of the public function; and the blame of those failures always it has others. Lastly, the revolutions also have implicit the cult to the personality, to the maximum leader of the process. All this is present in the 'beautiful revolution' of Chávez.

* For Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza (*El Nacional*, 21 April, 2002):

"it is a really clinical case that of Hugo Chavez, determined to take out ahead one for him called Bolivarian revolution that nobody has never known on what it consists, against wanting of all that counts in their country: managers, middle classes, workers, intellectuals, journalists, religious bosses and even its own Armed forces. Of anything they are worth the lockouts neither the dins of saucepans that are listened in everywhere Caracas when he speaks, to convince him that he is not Bolívar's second edition. The having colonel is persuaded of only having the popular support because his friends have known how to organize neighborhood hoodlums' huddles with red berets, following the example of the Brigades of Quick Action of Castro. To that Marx put it a name: 'lumpen'. And it has never been a government's support. To believe that there the Venezuelan true people is and that of the other side there are only merciless

oligarchies defending their interests, it is a distortion, a foolish thing of the reality that would require psychiatric attention".

* For Simón Alberto Consalvi what is witnessing is the din like revolution (*El Nacional*, 18 February 2001):

"A din of military parades, of goose steps, of drums and kettledrums, of long marches. The din of a single speech that repeats in an incessant way. The din of ministers that they enter and they leave without leaving word of what they have made, or that they renounce and they stay in their offices that are and they are not. The din of the National Assembly that neither it passes the laws that it should approve, neither it receives the memoirs and bills of the ministers, but that it has, that yes, a hundred hands willing to run off with, with the habit sign, or with the blink of the eye that leans out from the great window of the town. The deputed honorable Robot's unicameral great assembly. Great Simon Rodriguez never thought that a din of so big proportions could be given. Those dins had other dimensions, dins in colonial small cities, or in the Andean villages that it traveled on foot, as a good preacher. This Venezuelan din of the XXI century was never imagined."

* For Allan Brewer Carías, in tight synthesis (*The crisis of the Venezuelan democracy*, 2002):

"Venezuela lives a political tragedy at the moment. What could have been a government of change to deepen the democracy that allowed to begin, with the XXI own century, a new historical political cycle of decentralized democracy and participatory, it has not been another thing that a deformation and cartoon of all the bad habits of the cycle begun in 1945, the one which therefore, it has not concluded. In the frame of the history, that it will be the biggest punishment that will have the president Chavez and his assault troops, to have been constituted in the worst cycle of the centralist policies, with all the economic and social increased problems".

* For Teodoro Petkoff (*Hugo Chávez tal cual*, 2002):

"We live, from the arrival of this character to Miraflores, in a fool world. He triumphed where we had failed who we faced AD and Copei, but he has reproduced the worst features in that lingering hegemony. He constantly exalts the participatory democracy but he accompanies it of the most elementary, wild and annoying authoritarian 'personalism'. Daily diatribes against the neo-liberalism and the wild capitalism and total absence of real actions, as much in the economic thing as in the social thing that conform an alternative plan to what is declared to refute. Constant ejaculations about the poverty that they nurture a sterile populist tournament, don't change for anything the luck of the poor. Permanent invocation to the unavoidable demand of austerity in the public and private life of all citizen and monumental waste in his action like ruler. Nationalist strident birdcall, at the same time of a misleading foreign policy that rather puts in danger the sovereignty. We live a terrible division between the verb and the facts. Thousand of words that wrap a hole of realizations, such it has been and such a threat with being Hugo Chavez administration".

A revolutionary waste

It is provoking and scandalous the personal expense train that, from his government's beginning, the president Chavez adopted (Elizabeth Araujo: "The expenses of the occupation", *Gatopardo*, Bogotá, n° 36, 2003). It doesn't correspond to the austerity that they have given sample the big drivers and guides of revolutions in the world (Gandhi, Mao Sedung, Deng.Xiaoping, Julius Nyerere, Mandela).

According to the deputy of Project Venezuela, Carlos Eduardo Berrizbeitia, the president Chavez spent in the 2004, a sum of 42.589 millions 674.590 bolivars, in the items of passages and accommodations, foods and drinks, security, ties, garments of dressing and mark clocks, medicines. What means a daily waste of 118 millions 651 thousand bolivars. It is an unjustified personal expense of the president of a Third World's country who ironically promotes the austerity of the people (Frontier, 13 December 2004). Expenses that have not been

clipped but increased in the following years, according to the same deputy's reports.

"Thousands of Venezuelans make a daily single meal, others don't eat and a great number of parents and mothers don't get work. It is not possible that the waste example that has given the president Chavez this year, go with its speech, it is a double speech. The boss of the State this year it has cost the Venezuelans those 42 thousand million and half bolivars, that expense is contradicted in a revolution."

Unfulfilled promises

A well-known thinker and writer who supported the project of Chávez, he has consigned -in a documental work of 272 pages- the promises that the new leader and current President made to the Venezuelan people and that they continue unfulfilled (Pastor Heydra: *Chávez's promises*, Caracas, 2003).

The newspaper *El Nacional* made a substantial presentation of whole page in four followed editions whose titles underline some of its big commitments (2003: 31 August, 1° September; 2 September; 3 September):

"Chavez promised in 1996 to make efficient to the State and competitive to the economy", "candidate Chavez swore that it would never impose the control of change", "The offer of an austere government and including it took to Chavez to the power", "Chavez swore an economic revolution after the elections of 2000."

In an arduous work of eight months, Rafael Osio Cabrices actively participated and he has made us an excellent presentation and comment of the Heydra's book (*El Nacional*, 5 September 2003):

"There everything is: the most coherent declarations and the most picturesque deliriums; the serene exhibitions before

professional listeners and the harangues would set on fire; the praises, the insults, the genesis and the development of a "government" played by the word. The verbal history of a political career is in *Chavez's promises*, that of the having colonel (given of low) Hugo Chavez, but also that of a country that, in an enough part as to take him rightfully to the power for the electoral road, he believed in what that military one that had failed as pusher told him".

Partial conclusion

The term 'revolution' it is not new in the political history of Venezuela. If there is country where it has been abused of that concept, that it is Venezuela. Here there have been the Blue Revolution, the Federal one, the Restoring Liberal, that of October. But I never eat now, with the government rhetoric, the term has been more present than in past joints.

The term in its true meaning implies something serious, demanding, radical. It is not a game of rebellious with cause or without cause; it is not more an adventure without knowing to where it leaves; it is not a simple relief of those who send in the country; it is not the threat of reformations against those that have in favor of those that don't have. A revolution is a substantial change of the structures of a society. It is an earthquake of what exists to build the demanding design of what comes. It usually defines it to him with economic, political and social approaches. In this case, it is the only revolution that is defined with an aesthetic approach: the '*beautiful revolution*.' And to ten years of his proposal, we don't still know toward where he wants to drive and which the society model or utopian toward the one that he forces to go to the community.

What encourages still to this revolution, sustains it to the interior of the country and to the exterior, it is their inexhaustible support of petrodollars. It is

the success of this unique case in the history. It is a "*prepaid revolution*"

Serious and objective analysis of its visible components suggests ("for the time being") that if it is dared and unjust to designate it like "a revolution of saliva" (M.Caballero), the aforementioned one is not properly 'revolution' neither 'bolivarian'. One has wanted 'to rescue' to Bolivar frequently adducing him, but frequently mutilating him, when mentioning him outside of context, without the hero can complain.

Regrettably, for its results (up to now), the 'revolution' -that would justify the baptism of a new "Fifth Republic"- it doesn't make but corroborating the severe judgment of Level de Goda on the political history of Venezuela (*Contemporary History of Venezuela*, 1893. Mentioned by Antonio Sánchez García: *Dictatorship or democracy. Venezuela in the crossroad*, Caracas, 2003):

"The revolutions have not taken place in Venezuela but the most vulgar leadership, personal governments and of caciques, big disorders and outrages, corruption and a long and horrendous tyranny, the moral ruin of the country and the degradation of a great number of Venezuelans."